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INTRODUCTION
The paper aims at proving that despite the different starting points, applied eco-
nomic policies, and historical circumstances, the banking sector’s structure in all
south-eastern European1 (SEE) country cases became similar by the end of the
transitional process. It can be concluded, that despite the different political
attempts and applied policies, a rather similar template could be outlined for the
banking sector’s development path by the end of the transition process. This was
due both to the similar challenges and the financial globalisation.
The paper focuses on the transition and stabilisation of the commercial bank-
ing system in SEE. Following the introduction, the sector’s transformation process
is reviewed. This includes a brief overview of the main legacies of the socialist time
period. This is followed by a chapter on the role of foreign banks, incorporating a
relevant literature review. This topic is particularly important in SEE, as large for-
eign banking groups played a pivotal role during the transition process, since they
gradually gained terrain and became the dominant actors of the sector in all coun-
try cases. Finally, a comparative overview helps to conclude. Throughout the
paper, comparative analysis is used as a primary tool for the analytical work. It is
worth emphasising that strict time limits cannot be drawn for the transition, as the
process has still not been concluded in certain aspects. Nevertheless, the paper
includes analysis only up to 2007. It must be mentioned that despite its impor-
tance, the regulatory and supervisory framework is excluded from the analysis or
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1 SEE refers to Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, FYR Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and
Kosovo. Though Kosovo’s status is disputable, it is treated here as a separate country. The term SEE is
used in the jargon of the European Union and refers to the region of the candidate and potential can-
didate countries. SEE is often used as a synonym for the “Western Balkans”.
The paper analyses the commercial banking sector's development in south-
eastern Europe during the transition period. The transition of the banking sec-
tor evolved - or is still evolving - parallel with the general economic transition.
However, due to its complexity and the widespread factors that influence its
activity, its development was a slow and gradual process with occasional sys-
temic meltdowns. The paper proves that despite the different legacies, initial
condition, applied economic policies, and historical events, the banking sec-
tor's structure became similar in all country cases by the end of the transition
period. This similarity could be explained by the mutual challenges and the
financial globalisation.
it is only briefly mentioned. The same applies for the macroeconomic environ-
ment.
The region of SEE is particularly important for various international actors.
Among them is the European Union (EU), not only because of its geographical
closeness, but also due to the strong economic linkages that have been built in the
previous years. Furthermore, all countries in SEE participate in the EU accession
process, which also means that economic integration becomes a core element. The
banking system itself can be considered as a pillar of this integration and the catch-
ing-up process. Analysing the transition of this sector is inevitable for understand-
ing the current structures, operations and challenges.
1. THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE BANKING SECTOR
During the socialist period, Albania and the Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (SFRY) implemented two completely different economic models. The
former country represented a special case within the European socialist bloc,
with its constant loyalty to the classical socialist system and its isolation. SFRY
shifted to the other end and became probably the most unique socialist proto-
type, due to the fact that it became an odd mixture of market oriented and social-
ist elements.2 The same applied for the banking system: while the Albanian bank-
ing system remained in line with the classical socialist model, in SFRY the bank-
ing sector developed parallel with the general economic reform waves and incor-
porated various market economic elements over time. To mention one of the fun-
damental differences, SFRY established a two-tier banking system from the 1960s,
when local banks were established and it was prohibited for the central bank to
channel credits directly.3 However, during the transition period, both Albania
and the successor states of SFRY had to tackle the same challenges. It can be con-
cluded that throughout the socialist years the banking system in the countries
had limited or no experience
 as a financial intermediary, because its role was rather limited on recording
transactions in Albania and remained narrow in SFRY,
 in the credit evaluation and risk management methods and tools,
 in international accounting, as accounting rather served the monitoring of
the plan fulfilments,
 in – generally speaking – banking in a “real” market economy [Cani–Hadëri,
2002].
Likewise, in case of the general economic transition process, a range of tasks
could be listed for the banking sector’s transformation. This means that a certain
kind of “Washington consensus” could be set up for the banking sector as well.
This included the separation of the commercial banks and the central bank, the
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2 To read more on these economies, see e.g. Kornai (1992), Gligorov (1998), Schnytzer (1982),
Singleton (1976), Sjöberg–Wyzan (eds, 1991) or Uvalic (2010).
3 For more details on the banking systems, see for instance Cani - Hadëri (2002), Gedeon (1987), Lydall
(1984) or Šević et al (2002).
abolition of restrictions on the internal convertibility of money, the interest rate
liberalisation, the restructuring and privatisation of state banks including their
enterprise borrowers, the entry of new private banks. Parallel with these tasks, in
order to curtail the risk of the rapid market liberalisation process, which could not
be achieved in case of SEE, the state played a crucial role in building the regulato-
ry and supervisory system. This also included the building of the physical and
human capacity of related authorities and courts. As a further pillar, the enterprise
reforms could be considered complementary to the banking reforms. Particularly
the areas of bankruptcy and corporate governance were crucial for the banking
sector’s sound development. Not only in SEE, but generally within the range of
transition economies, both the pace and sequencing of these steps showed great
differences [Fries–Taci, 2002]. Nevertheless, the institutional framework had to
remain dynamic in order to adapt to the changing market environment. This
required a continuous development process from the side of policy makers. All in
all, the primary and theoretical goal of the reforms was to build a sound banking
system which fulfils the tasks that are required in a well-functioning market econ-
omy. These are the improvement of risk management, the allocation of resources,
monitoring managers and exerting corporate control, the mobilisation of savings,
facilitating the exchange of goods and services, and absorbing financial and real
economic shocks [Levine 1997, ECB 2010].
The stabilisation and the establishment of a market-oriented banking system
was usually part of the general stability and reform programs. Before the transi-
tion, banks in SEE were characterised by a very high ratio of non-performing loans,
high lending rates, and lack of competition, which was coupled with an environ-
ment of transitional recession and high inflation. Furthermore, in case of the suc-
cessor states of Yugoslavia, the banking system had to cope with the aftermaths of
the “frozen” FX savings trauma.4 Taking all these into consideration, it is quite evi-
dent that the inherited banking system collapsed in each SEE country and had to
be consolidated and rebuilt with large state support. Nevertheless, the starting
positions, the particular mechanisms, sequencing, timing, and duration showed
great differences.
The EBRD index of banking sector reform summarises the level of banking
reform and interest rate liberalisation for transitional countries with a single score.
The scores are available from 1 to 4+, whereby 1 refers to minor progress beyond
the establishment of the two-tier banking system, while 4+ means the adaption of
153DOKTORI MŰHELYEKBŐL
4 From the 1970s and 1980s, credit institutions borrowed FX loans on international markets with sov-
ereign guarantees, and financed projects that were supported by the authorities related to these
funds. Meanwhile, fostered by the growing amount of remittances and incomes from tourism, the
increasing sum of FX deposits was to a large extent redeposited at the national bank in exchange for
dinar credits. However, from the 1980s the dinar was often devalued as inflation gained momentum,
while as a further risk, the central bank's FX reserves started to decline. The large amount of house-
holds' FX deposits that were previously transferred to the central bank in Belgrade – as a consequence
of the monetary system’s problems – became irretrievable and “frozen” [Barisitz 2008]. This was the
first major shock that undermined the confidence in the banking sector for long-term, while the com-
pensation of the household sector is still an unsettled issue in most of the successor states.
the advanced industrial economies’ norms.5 With the help of this index, Chart 1
reflects an overview of the banking system’s transition dynamism in the SEE coun-
tries. The mentioned differences of timing and development level can be very well
observed. The starting date of the major restructuring varied over a decade, but all
countries converged to the same development level and reached index 3, with the
exception of Croatia, which achieved a more dynamic progress and a higher score
compared to the rest of the SEE countries. The background of these differences
and similarities will be highlighted in the following.
Source: EBRD statistics
Note: No data for Kosovo.
Chart 1: EBRD index of banking sector reform for SEE countries
Starting with the country, which inherited a “classical” socialist system, in
Albania, as part of the stabilisation program and implemented in 1992, the two-tier
banking system was established following the adoption of the central bank and
commercial banking laws. On the remains of the former monobank, a central bank
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5 The following explanation is provided for the specific scores related to the banking reform and inter-
est rate liberalisation:
“1: Little progress beyond establishment of a two-tier system.
2: Significant liberalisation of interest rates and credit allocation; limited use of directed credit or
interest rate ceilings.
3: Substantial progress in establishment of bank solvency and of a framework for prudential supervi-
sion and regulation; full interest rate liberalisation with little preferential access to cheap refinancing;
significant lending to private enterprises and significant presence of private banks.
4: Significant movement of banking laws and regulations towards BIS standards; well-functioning
banking competition and effective prudential supervision; significant term lending to private enter-
prises; substantial financial deepening.
4+: Standards and performance norms of advanced industrial economies: full convergence of banking
laws and regulations with BIS standards; provision of full set of competitive banking services.”
(Source: Transition indicators methodology,
http://www.ebrd.com/pages/research/economics/data/macro/ti_methodology.shtml, downloaded:
15/04/2011)
and three universal banks were created (the Agriculture and Development Bank,
the Savings Bank and the Import-Export Commercial Bank). Furthermore, the cen-
tral bank was separated from both the commercial banks and the fiscal authority,
abolishing automatic budget deficit financing by law.6 This meant that the central
bank, renamed as the Bank of Albania, gained a completely new ground and
remained in charge only of the monetary policy with strict rules on issuing money.
During the first years of transition, bankruptcy procedures could not be initiated
and most medium and large-enterprises were still not privatised. These features led
to a massive inter-enterprise crediting activity of which a substantial amount
became bad debt. Furthermore, just as in the previous regime, the still non-priva-
tised firms continued to require funds from the government or as a secondary solu-
tion they borrowed at negative interest rates [Pashko 1996, Dushku 2010].7 The
transition process of the banking sector lasted a decade. During the early 1990s,
the three state-owned commercial banks dominated the market accumulating large
debts. One of them was liquidated in 1998 and another was privatised in 2000,
while the largest of the three with broad national coverage was privatised to a for-
eign investor only in 2003. Beside these, several foreign banks penetrated the mar-
ket by acquiring licences with the fulfilment of the requirements of the banking
law, which was gradually strengthened throughout the years [Šević et al 2002].
The favourable development in Albania, which started after the stabilisation of
the economy, was abruptly shattered by the collapse of several large pyramid
schemes, which held a large part of the population’s savings. Pyramid companies
in Albania operated already from the early 1990s, but their activities culminated in
1996. Many people even sold their belongings, including for instance farms or
homes, expecting 50–100 percent interest within a matter of weeks. The growth
of the large pyramid companies was supported by their coordinated publicity cam-
paigns and was not interrupted by warnings or measures from the government or
authorities [Biberaj 1998]. Based on conservative estimations, almost USD 0.5 bil-
lion was invested in various pyramid funds [Biberaj 1998, p. 317]. The collapse of
these pyramid schemes in 1997 led again to a major turmoil in Albania, including
social unrest and governmental failure. According to estimations, the amount of
the affected total liabilities reached almost half of the annual GDP [Šević et al 2002,
p. 28]. Due to the fact that the people have lost their savings, the consumption fell
sharply, the real GDP contracted by 11 percent, while inflation exceeded 33 per-
cent [EBRD statistics]. Foreign intervention was needed to regain a certain level of
public order, and thanks to an economic recovery program, the country was able
to return to a period of low inflation and fair GDP growth within a year. The new
program focused on a wide range of fields, including the development of the insti-
tutional system, the social and economic policies and boosting the economic activ-
ity [Šević et al 2002]. However, just as in the case of the “frozen” FX savings in
Yugoslavia, the collapse of the pyramid schemes had a similar, long lasting psycho-
logical effect on the financial behaviour of the Albanian population. To conclude,
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6 A credit ceiling was implied, which was 10% of the previous year's revenues.
7 These phenomena fuelled the rapid growth of broad money and inflation.
after the transition process with its temporary shock waves the banking sector
gained stability, but the financial deepening remained low, with one of the highest
ratio of cash per GDP among the transition countries [Šević et al 2002].
Croatia’s case showed many similarities with the Albanian experience. The
Croatian banking system was insolvent or had problems related to the settlement
of claims by 1990, domestic savings were either part of the “frozen” amounts or
were transferred to other countries during the upheaval. The first Banking Law
that was adopted in 1993 has set up the minimum capital requirements of the sys-
tem and liberalised the entry for new banks. Rehabilitation measures were taken
already in 1991, but this was rather a one-off bookkeeping operation. In 1994, the
State Agency for Bank Rehabilitation and Deposit Insurance was established which
started a case-by-case rehabilitation for the largest banks in the sector [Barisitz
2008]. Following this period, the amount of savings – especially FX deposits –
increased sharply, proving the growing confidence in the system. Attracted by the
higher interest rates, savings from foreign banks were transferred to domestic
banks and savings from “mattresses” were deposited [Šonje–Vujčić 1999]. The
deposit base of the banks became FX dominated again. At the same time, a large
part of the enterprise sector was unable to repay its debts to the banks by 1995.
The government supported these companies by issuing special bonds, which were
used for the repayment of the debts. This resulted in the large amount of public
debts in the banking sector’s balance sheets [Šević et al 2002].
All in all, the rehabilitation of Croatian banks featured cash payments and
required large amount of sovereign issuing. Meanwhile, prudent lending policy
was still lacking and loan repayments remained problematic. Furthermore, the
bankruptcy policies were applied in a poor manner. In cases of mergers and acqui-
sitions the experience was often missing. With the dominance of FX base, banks
became particularly vulnerable to FX market movements. In addition, small and
medium-sized banks offered higher interest rates for FX deposits to outperform
their competitors. These were coupled by the international financial crisis of
1997–98, which limited the access to foreign credits. All these weaknesses and vul-
nerabilities led to a second major banking crisis in 1998 [Barisitz 2008, Šević et al
2002]. Few banks were rehabilitated and, following a budget revision, insured
deposits of bankrupt banks were paid out. According to estimations, in the period
of 1991–99 the cumulative government debt that was issued for bank rehabilita-
tion reached around 32 percent of the GDP [Barisitz 2008, p. 51]. This second
wave of the banking crisis brought a major shift in both the government’s and the
banking sector’s policy and practice. The banking market swiftly changed, as many
small and medium-sized bank exited, the state gradually withdrew from the sector
while foreign strategic investors entered the market by acquiring stakes in leading
credit institutions that have been rehabilitated in the former years. After this peri-
od, the supervision strengthened and banks became more cautious in their bank-
ing activity, noting that the creditor rights were still insufficient in the real sector
[Barisitz, 2008].
Turning to Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYRM), the privatisation
in the banking sector was conducted within the programme of enterprise privati-
sation, but additional special measures were not taken. The Banks and Saving
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Banks Act came into force in 1993 and it determined the capital requirement for
the sector. It was quite widespread that banks continued to finance loss-making
enterprises with low debt servicing capacity, which could partly be explained by
debt-equity swaps, where banks collected enterprise stocks. To respond to these
problems, in 1995 the policy makers took measures to restructure and rehabilitate
the banking sector. In the previous year a rehabilitation agency was established to
collect bad loans from the enterprise sector and link it with the rehabilitation of
the banks. The cost of rehabilitation reached 42 percent of the GDP, with 12 per-
cent referring to the cleaning of bad loans from the banks’ balance sheets and 30
percent to the repayment of the “frozen” foreign saving [Šević et al 2002, p. 277].
However, the stabilisation of the system took place only after the banks’ were
restructured as well by new owners. These steps gradually pointed to the banking
system’s increasing profitability, led to comfortable capitalisation ratios and the
drop of bad loans [Šević et al 2002].
One of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s (BH) most notable differentiating feature
stems from its unique state structure. This means that, just as in case of the gener-
al economic development, the banking system in the two entities (in the
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBH) and in Republika Srpska (RS)) devel-
oped separately. The lag in the sector’s rehabilitation and restructuring originated
from the war and the unclear state structure. A further delay was caused by differ-
ent priorities, as healing the banking system was not included in the initial eco-
nomic stability measures. The Federation Banking Agency started its operation in
1997 and the legislation for bank privatisation was passed the next year. The
Banking Agency for the RS was established in 1998 and the privatisation started
somewhat later, but with a quicker pace. The privatisation or liquidation of the
banks began by the preparation of opening balance sheets. The insolvent banks
were shut down in 2000. The banks’ impaired assets and liabilities were trans-
ferred to the Ministry of Finance, with the balance sheets cut by 80 percent. The
amount of the “frozen” foreign currency deposits reached more than 80 percent of
the total assets. Capitalisation was low at the beginning, thus the capacity for the
lending activity was limited [Šević et al 2002]. However, a gradual development
started from the 2000s in both entities. It is worth mentioning that even the super-
visory and regulatory system mirrors the scattered state structure, since separate
agencies operate in both entities, but even a state-level coordinating authority
became necessary. Moreover, separate agencies have been established for the bank-
ing, insurance, and securities sector. This means that nine agencies need to coop-
erate with each other to cover the complete financial sector, which can be consid-
ered unique even within SEE.
Among the countries of the region, the largest lag in the banking sector’s devel-
opment could be observed within the group of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(FRY). This implies that the “lost decade” term does not only refer to the general
economic reforms, but also for the complete financial sector’s transition process.
During the 1990s, no major banking sector restructuring took place, only certain
legal documents were passed. Such document was the Law on Banks and Other
Financial Organisations, which came into force in 1993 and applied a new regula-
tory framework for the system. During the years of hyperinflation, the value of the
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dinar assets and liabilities were wiped out of the banks’ balance sheets. By the sec-
ond half of the 1990s, the banking sector was in a catastrophic shape, as the ratio
of bad loans amounted to around 90 percent and the sector was saddled with neg-
ative capital. Despite these features, the central bank required the largest banks to
keep the credit lines open for the reviving real sector [Barisitz 2008].
Within the group of FRY, fundamental reforms in Serbia started only in the
2000s after the fall of the Milošević regime. 2001 was spent for the assessment of
the system and plans were set for the restructuring strategy with the help of the
international financial institutions. Likewise in other SEE cases, the confidence
regarding the banking system became very low, due to the painful experience of
“frozen” FX deposits and the various pyramid scheme scandals of the 1990s. The
level of public mistrust could be well measured by the euro cash changeover in
2002, as the cash needed to be deposited for the conversion process. EUR 4 billion
was paid in and converted, but following this action three-quarter of the amount
was withdrawn again. In 2002, the authorities issued state bonds in exchange for
the repayment of the “frozen” savings, and the restructuring of the banking system
was launched. As a first set of the actions, a few banks were closed or equity capi-
tal was written off. Later in 2002, the authorities converted state claims to shares
in many medium-sized banks, thus nationalising them and prepared them for the
privatisation or resolution. The consolidation and privatisation of the largest banks
was carried out case-by-case, thus requiring a longer time period [Barisitz 2008],
but by 2010 the process still remained incomplete.8 Nevertheless, by the end of the
day the sector regained its stability and started its way on the regular transitional
SEE development path.
Montenegro also had to experience the boom and bust of large pyramid
schemes in the late 1990s. This shock took the banking sector to the verge of melt-
down and further ruined public confidence [Barisitz 2008]. In case of the tiny
Montenegrin market, the banking sector’s assessment and the start of the consoli-
dation took place in 2001. So compared to Serbia, the starting date was the same
but the sequencing was somewhat different. Two banks were liquidated, a few
banks were nationalised and prepared for privatisation or resolution. The largest
bank was temporarily put under the central bank’s administration, its balance
sheet was cleared and was sold to foreign investors in 2003 [Barisitz 2008]. Public
confidence was further enhanced by the Deposit Protection Fund, which was
established in 2006. As in the case of Serbia, the Montenegrin banking system was
able to recover and gained its stability as a result of the implemented measures.
Parallel with this, public confidence slowly started to recover. Both Serbia and
Montenegro experienced reviving credit growth and increasing deposit base from
the mid-2000s.
In Kosovo, after the NATO bombing, the banking infrastructure was missing,
meaning both the physical presence and the framework. This means that the finan-
cial sector and its supervisory and regulatory system had to be built from scratch.
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8 The privatisation of the largest state-owned bank - Komercijalna Banka - has been planned for years,
but in mid-2011 it was still not carried out. For a hint on the related public debate, see
http://www.ekonomskisavetdss.com/english/2011/01/ivan-ninic-dangerous-intentions-of-the-regime/.
Kosovo’s banking sector recovered under the administration of the United Nations
Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the guidance of interna-
tional financial institutions. Many microfinance institutions were established by
the support of international institutions and had an important role in building the
banking sector9 [Barisitz 2008], which was less typical in other SEE countries.
Likewise in case of Serbia and Montenegro, Kosovo’s banking industry had a swift
development from the mid-2000s, although from a very tiny base and low sophisti-
cation. Foreign banks penetrated the market and local banks were established. The
central bank became responsible for all licensing, supervisory, and regulatory
functions. The gradual development of the banking system represents the growing
confidence in the system in a typically cash-based economy. Likewise in case of
other SEE countries, Kosovo’s banking system became dominated by foreign-
owned banks [CBK 2010].
2. THE ENTRY OF FOREIGN BANKS – A WIN-WIN SITUATION?
Both the socialist Albania and SFRY provided a challenging legacy for the countries
of SEE. There was a lack of experience regarding modern capitalist banking tech-
niques and environment. However, through the parent bank-subsidiary channel,
foreign banks contributed to the region’s economic transition from a socialist
model to a market economy. This channel was supported by the brisk globalisation
of the banking sector.
Generally, the foreign banks in transition economies were able to enhance the
transfer of various benefits and resources, including, know-how, international
accounting and auditing standards, managerial skills, IT technology, risk manage-
ment techniques, loan monitoring methods, business network, relevant market
information, product innovation [Barisitz 2008, Fries–Taci 2002, Karas et al 2010].
As for the latter, during the development process the banking sector penetrated to
everyday life, while the range of products and services widened: new investment
products, mortgage loans, credit cards, alternatives for consumer finance, dedicat-
ed products for small and medium-sized enterprises became more and more wide-
spread in the region. Via the product innovation, banks “teach” the household and
the corporate sector to use new products, all leading to an increasing degree of
intermediation.10 Furthermore, for a region that was poor in capital, the foreign
funding played an important role in the expansion and development of the bank-
ing sector. Through their parent banks, subsidiaries were able to have market
access to cheaper funding from more developed financial markets and to a certain
kind of implicit deposit insurance [Barisitz 2008, Karas et al 2010, EBRD 2004].
Generally, as competition intensified, interest spreads narrowed and efficiency
increased in the sector [Kraft 2002, Vujčić–Jemrić 2001]. The bottom line of the lit-
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9 For instance, in mid-2010 8 commercial banks (of which 6 were foreign-owned), 11 insurance com-
panies, 2 pension funds, 29 financial auxiliaries and 17 microfinance institutions operated in Kosovo
[CBK 2010, p. 25].
10 To read an overview on the access to domestic finance, see e.g. EBRD (2004).
erature on the efficiency of the transition economies’ banking system is that for-
eign banks are usually more efficient than their domestic partners [Fries–Taci
2004], whereas there is mixed evidence on the comparison of the domestic private
and public institutions.11 It is also important that in almost all transitional coun-
tries there was lack of trust and confidence in the local banking system, which was
particularly true for SEE, so the entry of foreign banks with good international rep-
utation helped to increase the amount of domestic savings that could be then chan-
nelled to proper investments [Keren–Ofer 2003]. Keren and Ofer (2003) argue
that foreign banks may improve even the financial regulatory system, as it is their
own interest to create a transparent environment where insider networks and cor-
ruption does not provide advantage for local actors. They even describe a vicious
circle, where foreign banks are not willing to enter the new market until the legal
environment and supervision allows unrealistic advantages for domestic banks,
which finally leads to a potential financial crisis. On the other hand, the entry of
foreign banks may support the improvement of the regulatory and supervisory sys-
tem, thus generating the vicious circle.
All in all, these facts do not imply that foreign takeovers provide the one and
only route for the establishment of a well-functioning banking sector, moreover it
even incorporates particular risks12, but nevertheless it definitely bolsters the
development process compared to a home-grown system [Barisitz 2008]. As a
macroeconomic result of the banking system’s transition, the complete economies’
transaction and payment system developed, while savings and resources were
mobilised across the economy [Keren–Ofer 2003]. Despite the dominance of these
positive effects, political motivations or nationalistic creeds often blocked the
entry of foreign banks but even the privatisation process, which was then often
enforced by a banking crisis [Bokros 2001, Keren–Ofer 2003]. This caused great
differences in the development of the country cases, even within SEE. However, in
a matter of time, finally most of the transition economies and all SEE countries
started a rather similar financial development path with the dominance of a for-
eign-owned banking sector.
As Hryckiewicz and Kowalewski (2008) demonstrate in their empirical study
on central European countries, foreign banks’ engagement depends on the poten-
tial of the market and the degree of financial sophistication. While in developed
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11 For a literature review on this topic, see e.g. Karas et al (2010).
12 There is a wide range of risks that became particularly relevant during the current global crisis peri-
od. Such risks can be highlighted as e.g. the case of a banking group pulling out from a specific coun-
try, the import of home country shocks or the too strong pressure of competition indicating to take
too high risks by the banks. Many of the risks can be mitigated, but can never be completely avoid-
ed by the regulatory and supervisory framework.
Stiglitz et al (1993), for instance has three arguments in favour of restrictions on the competition
from foreign banks; a certain kind of infant industry argument can be adapted for the domestic bank-
ing sector, discrepancies can be observed between social and private returns in case of lending that
leads to different investment patterns, international banking groups have the advantage of not hav-
ing so strong pressure or control from the governments. Stiglitz describes seven market failures in
the financial sector and is in favour of governmental intervention, which however can generate cor-
ruption and assumes "wise" governments.
countries the banks usually rather expand in developed markets, the case is just the
opposite in central Europe. According to Williams’ (2002) “defensive expansion
hypothesis”, banks follow their clients abroad, as information on clients is among
the most important values of the banks. However, according to Mérő–Valentinyi
(2003), this hypothesis does not apply for the emerging markets. It is rather the
need for monitoring via physical presence. Hryckiewicz and Kowalewski (2008)
find that in the beginning of the transition process the “defensive expansion
hypothesis” holds, while this motivation is replaced by the “search for client’s
behaviours” at a later phase. They also show that the poor creditor rights, the com-
mon law, and the geographical distance are among the main determinants of for-
eign bank entries. The latter can be very well seen in case of SEE as well.
Furthermore, it is interesting that evidence can also be found for religious links, as
e.g. in Bosnia and Herzegovina banks operate also from Muslim countries.
Based on the literature and empirical evidence, from the large European bank-
ing groups’ point of view, the privatisation process in SEE offered a unique oppor-
tunity to gain new markets in a neighbouring region that is better known and
understandable for the European culture. In most of the economies, gradually a
more stable and thus tempting legal and regulatory environment has been estab-
lished. Moreover, SEE countries are taking part in the EU accession process, which
provides the advantages of the EU common policies and the financial support of
the programmes. Beside these factors, the most important is that foreign banks
were able to start building up stable market positions at an early stage of the catch-
ing-up and real convergence process. This offers a higher growth potential13 even
on long-term and higher profitability indicators, which are able to compensate the
higher risk factors that emerging economies carry. In addition, large banking
groups were also motivated to diversify their portfolios in a further European
region [Clarke et al 2001, Haas–Lelyveld 2003]. Finally, it must be mentioned that
when analysing market entry and the increase of capital flows, it is also important
to bear in mind the home countries’ market conditions. The strategic opening of
EU banks regarding the emerging European countries was underpinned by the sta-
ble economic environment in the home countries, which included low money
market rates, thus low funding costs, and healthy financial conditions without cap-
ital pressure. All these resulted in the fact that SEE became one of the most dynam-
ic and profitable banking regions in Europe, with very favourable outlook. As mar-
ket competition intensified14 and the banking market became more mature, prof-
itability indicators slightly decreased and converged to the euro area’s average, but
this impact was well compensated by the effect of dynamically increasing volumes.
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13 Albertazzi and Gambacorta (2006) analyse the pro-cyclical nature of banking profitability. Among
other conclusions, not surprisingly, they find that GDP affects both the net interest income through
the lending activity and the loan loss provisions by the credit portfolio quality.
14 It is assumed that the higher market concentration indicates bigger profits. However, empirical stud-
ies contradict to this belief (see e.g. Havrylchyk-Jurzyk, 2006), as foreign banks might charge lower
interest rates in order to increase market share, thus generating competition. One can find mixed
evidence when comparing the profitability of domestic and foreign-owned banks (see e.g. Mérő-
Valentinyi, 2003).
3. CONCLUSIONS AND COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW
The SEE countries started their transition process with completely different start-
ing points and legacies, but they still faced similar tasks and challenges. Albania iso-
lated itself from the rest of the world and implied a “classical” socialist system with
the lack of democratic traditions. In contrast to the SFRY, Albania remained the
poorest15 and probably the most backward country in Europe. Regarding the suc-
cessor states of Yugoslavia, the countries had to face double fundamental changes
during the first half of the 1990s. First of all, Yugoslavia broke up to several new
countries, which was coupled by devastating military actions in many areas. From
an economic perspective, new independent units had to be created and the scenes
of destruction had to be rebuilt. In addition, the countries were occasionally direct-
ly or indirectly affected by the embargos on Serbia and FYR Macedonia. Secondly,
parallel with these processes, Yugoslavia and the new states had to address the
challenges of the “classical” transition process. Although SFRY represented a
unique case among the European socialist countries with its system of self-manage-
ment and various implemented market-economic elements, a completely new insti-
tutional framework had to be established, while actors still did not have ample
experience with real capitalist mechanisms. Even during the socialist time period,
large differences were present regarding the development of the republics, but fol-
lowing the dissolution of Yugoslavia this heterogeneity increased further, due to
the new countries’ applied policies, and their internal and external shocks. To add
up, the following three groups of factors differentiated the countries of SEE:
 the initial development level, institutional system and self-sustainability,
 the impacts of military conflicts, sanctions and embargos,
 the starting date, sequencing, duration and methods of the stabilising and
restructuring policies.
Regarding the banking system, the institutional structure that the former-social-
ist system has left behind was completely different in Albania than in the successor
states of Yugoslavia. In the former case, the socialist monobank was the ground for
the restructuring. Regarding the latter, a two-tier and scattered banking system
with large number of small local banks has been inherited. However, the problems
and tasks remained similar; a socialist model had to be transformed into a market-
led capitalist system. During the transition process, a range of country-specific
internal and external shocks affected the banking sector’s operation. In certain
countries even a second banking crisis or the collapse of large pyramid schemes
caused shockwaves or meltdown in the financial sector. As already discussed, the
methodology, pace, and sequencing of the banking sector’s restructuring showed
great variety. Still, at the end of the day, the institutional structure became similar,
so despite the great differences in the starting points, one can specify a regional
template for the banking industry’s development: following a systemic collapse
large European banking groups penetrated the local markets, swiftly gained terrain
at an initial phase, contributed to the sector’s restructuring and fuelled rapid cred-
it growth in a next stage.
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15 See for instance the statistics from the EBRD or the IMF.
*1994–2001: FR Yugoslavia
Note: Time series are not available for Kosovo, but for instance in June 2010 the share
of foreign-owned bank assets amounted to 89.8 percent of the total banking sector
assets [CBK 2010, p. 28].
Source: EBRD Transition reports (various years) and EBRD statistics
Chart 2: Decreasing asset share of banks with state ownership exceeding 50 percent (%)
and increasing asset share of banks with foreign ownership exceeding 50 percent (%)
Chart 2 reflects the different starting dates of the banking sector’s rehabilita-
tion and privatisation. The lines and boxes represent the milestones in each coun-
try. Generally, rehabilitation was conducted before the privatisation, but in some
cases the privatisation could be considered as the cornerstone, or the two process-
es have been run in a parallel form. The slopes show the different paces of these
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processes. The most important outcome is that in each and every case, the asset
share of banks with a majority foreign ownership converges to the range over 75
percent. With the exception of Montenegro and Serbia, it is even over 85 percent.
In the latter case, this lower number can be explained by the lag regarding the
starting date of the sector’s restructuring, which resulted that despite the plans,
one of the largest state-owned banks has still not been privatised. So the decreas-
ing trend of state-ownership, and parallel with this the increase of foreign-owner-
ship proves well that the large foreign banking groups penetrated the markets in
SEE and achieved dominant positions. Furthermore, Chart 3 shows that the market
concentration is high. With the exception of Serbia, the asset share of the largest
banks is around 75 percent, which means that a limited number of large European
banking groups16 dominate the market in SEE.
*1994–2001: FR Yugoslavia
Note: Time series are not available for Kosovo.
Source: EBRD Transition reports (various years) and EBRD statistics
Chart 3: Share of total assets of five largest banks
The market structure is further elaborated by Chart 4 and shows how the num-
ber of banks stabilised in the region. This chart demonstrates well the different ini-
tial market structure of Albania and the former-Yugoslav states. The former started
its transition process from a monobank system and has gradually increased the
number of banks. The latter inherited large number of local banks, while their
numbers decreased as the result of bankruptcies, and the active mergers and acqui-
sition process. Nevertheless, Table 1 reflects that the number of banks per capita
shows significant differences.
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16 For more information on the ownership structure, please see the respective central banks' home-
page.
*1994–2001: FR Yugoslavia
Note: Includes branches of foreign banks
Source: EBRD Transition reports (various years), EBRD statistics and various statistical bul-
letins of the Central Bank of the Republic of Kosovo
Chart 4: Total number of banks
Table 1: Number of banks per capita (2007, multiplied by 1 million)
Source: EBRD Transition reports (various years), Statistical Office of
Kosovo, own calculations
It can be concluded that, the banking system played a primary role in the eco-
nomic development in two senses throughout the transition process. During its
stabilisation and restructuring, it has put extra burden on the fiscal authorities,
while on the other hand, once it was able to fulfil its market-oriented primary roles,
it was able to support the economic development in various fields. This includes,
for instance the support of economic growth or the channel of monetary policy.
Foreign banks played a particular role within this financial development process:
they contributed to the system’s transition through the transfer of various benefits
and resources, and the enhancement of competition. They also played a pivotal
role in the banking sector’s penetration to everyday life, both horizontally and ver-
tically, via financial deepening and product innovation. Furthermore, they con-
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tributed in restoring public confidence in a region where a significant part of the
population has lost their savings more than once – due to e.g. hyperinflation,
“frozen” FX savings or collapse of pyramid schemes. Foreign banks also under-
pinned the system’s stabilisation, as during the 1990s non-performing loan ratios
skyrocketed and capitalisation remained low, while during the next decade these
indicators reached acceptable levels.17 On the other hand, one must also stress the
related systemic risks that foreign banks carry. For instance, foreign banks had a
major role in the rapid credit growth in SEE, which could be considered as a pri-
mary macroeconomic and systemic risk factor that became particularly relevant
during the global crisis.
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